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Introduction 
  Conflicting trends confound the pharmaceutical 
industry.  The productivity of pharmaceutical innovation 
has declined in recent years, which is one reason why the 
share of generic products now accounts for nearly 70 
percent of all prescriptions filled in the United States.
1  
Despite spending on research and development (R&D) by U.S. 
companies that more than doubled (in current dollars) in 
the ten years between 1998 and 2008,
2 the number of new 
molecular entities introduced into U.S. markets has 
remained relatively stable at between 20 and 30 per year.  
Between 1970 and 2007, the average number of new entities 
approved per year was just over 21.
3 
  At the same time, the cohort of large companies who 
are the leading engines of pharmaceutical R&D has become 
increasingly concentrated.  As recently as 1998, the 
leading eight companies accounted for 36 percent of US 
industry shipments of pharmaceutical products.  By 2002, 
                                                 
1  Generic Pharmaceutical Association, Press Release of May 7, 2009. 
2  Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers of America, PhRMA Membership Survey, 2009.   
3  F.M. Scherer, “”Pharmaceutical Innovation,” in Bronwyn Hall and Nathan Rosenberg, eds., Handbook of 
the Economics of Technological Innovation, North Holland, 2010, p. 542-3.  See also Iain M. Cockburn, 
“The Changing Structure of the Pharmaceutical Industry,” Health Affairs, January/February 2004, p. 11.    3
their share had risen to more than 53 percent.
4  Actually, 
that figure understates the extent of concentration among 
research-based companies because it includes between 18 and 
24 percent of shipments made by generic product producers.
5    
  The concurrent presence of these trends is not 
sufficient to determine causation.  Indeed, causal factors 
could work both ways.  In response to lagging innovation 
prospects, some companies have sought refuge in mergers and 
acquisitions to disguise their dwindling prospects
6 or, some 
claim, to gain R&D synergies.  On the other hand, the 
increased concentration brought on by recent mergers may 
have contributed to the declining rate of innovation. 
In this paper, we consider the second of these causal 
relationships: the likely impact of the recent merger wave 
among the largest pharmaceutical companies on the rate of 
innovation.  In other words, have recent mergers, which may 
have been taken in response to lagging innovation, 
represented a self-defeating strategy that only made 
industry outcomes worse? 
                                                 
4  US Bureau of the Census, Concentration Ratios in Manufacturing Industries, Washington, various years. 
5  Ibid. 
6  Patricia Danzon et al., "Mergers and Acquisitions in the Pharmaceutical Industry," Managerial and 
Decision Economics, August 2007.  See also Peter Elkind and Jennifer Reingold, “Inside Pfizer’s Palace 
Coup,” Fortune, August 15, 2011. 
 
   4
Two recent mergers add prominence to this question:  
Pfizer’s acquisition of Wyeth Laboratories for $68 billion 
in January 2009, and Merck & Co.’s acquisition of Schering-
Plough a few months later for $41 billion.  In 2008, Pfizer 
invested $7.9 billion on pharmaceutical R&D while Wyeth 
spent $3.4 billion, for a total of $11.3 billion.  The 
combined firm would then account for 29 percent of U.S. 
pharmaceutical industry spending on R&D and roughly 22 
percent of world-wide spending.
7  In addtion, Merck had 
spent $4.8 billion on R&D in 2008 and Schering-Plough had 
spent $3.5 billion, for a total of $8.3 billion.  This 
second merger would then account for 22 percent of U.S. R&D 
spending and 17 percent world-wide.  The two merged 
entities therefore would thereby account for fully 51 
percent of total U.S. industry R&D spending and up to 39 
percent of total world-wide spending.   
Under existing U.S. antitrust policies, mergers can be 
evaluated in terms of their prospective effects on 
innovation as well as price levels.  We therefore discuss 
current policy standards on the importance of innovation to 
the antitrust consideration of mergers.  Then we shift our 
                                                 
7  Since neither Pfizer nor Wyeth report how much was spent in the United States and how much abroad, 
we compare these amounts with both totals.  According to PhRMA, total US spending by member 
companies on pharmaceutical R&D in 2008 was $38.4 billion in the United States and $50.3 billion 
worldwide.  Since, however, not all companies world-wide are PhRMA members, the suggested 
percentages may be overstated     5
attention to the theory of parallel research paths and 
review relevant prior studies.  Next, we offer a simulation 
analysis for insight into the optimal number of research 
paths at various combinations of research costs and 
payoffs.  We then review the structure of pharmaceutical 
research and development in order to relate the simulation 
results to current industry practice.  And finally, we draw 
conclusions as to the likely impact on pharmaceutical 
innovation of large horizontal mergers.          
 
Mergers and Innovation 
  The U.S. Federal Trade Commission evaluated the 
competitive effects of both mergers described above.  In 
Pfizer-Wyeth, it originally issued a complaint charging a 
violation of the antitrust laws, but then negotiated a 
consent order under which the parties agreed to divest 
their overlapping assets in the area of animal health.  In 
regard to human health markets, however, and specifically 
for the “market for basic research and innovation,” it 
found no adverse effects on competition.
8   
  The Commission followed a similar path in the Merck-
Schering Plough case, but then accepted a consent order 
                                                 
8  Federal Trade Commission, “Statement of the Federal Trade Commission Concerning Pfizer/Wyeth,” 
FTC File No. 091-0053, p. 3.   6
under which some assets were divested.  There was no 
mention in any public Commission document of the firms’ R&D 
activities even though they comprise a main mode of 
competition among large pharmaceutical companies. 
  The antitrust agencies typically focus on prospective 
pricing behavior in merger cases.  However, considering 
innovative behavior is not unprecedented.  In the 
investigation of a proposed merger between aerospace giants 
Lockheed-Martin and Northrop-Grumman during the late 1990s, 
for example, the fear that the sources of innovative weapon 
systems concepts would be significantly limited was central 
to an investigation by the Department of Justice.  No 
complaint was brought, however, because Lockheed realized 
that there was opposition to its merger in both the 
antitrust agencies and the Department of Defense, and 
voluntarily abandoned it. 
  On August 10, 2010, the Department of Justice and FTC 
issued revised Horizontal Merger Guidelines, which were 
said in the overview to “describe the principal analytical 
techniques and the main types of evidence on which the 
Agencies usually rely to predict whether a merger may 
substantially lessen competition.”   Section 6.4 of those 
Guidelines addresses “Innovation and Product Variety.”  It 
states in part:   7
 
Competition often spurs firms to innovate.  The 
Agencies may consider whether a merger is likely to 
diminish innovation competition by encouraging the 
merged firm to curtail its innovative efforts below 
the level that would prevail in the absence of the 
merger.  That curtailment of innovation could take the 
form of reduced incentive to continue with an existing 
product-development effort or reduced incentive to 
initiate development of new products.... 
 
  Although the new Guidelines were not yet published at 
the time of the Merck - Schering-Plough and Pfizer-Wyeth 
merger proposals, they were believed to reflect U.S. 
antitrust agency practice, must at least have been under 
discussion at the time of the giant pharmaceutical mergers, 
and were anticipated at least in the Lockheed - Northrop 
deliberations.
9  Nevertheless, the Federal Trade Commission 
chose not to act.  We believe its inaction was mistaken. 
  
The Theory of Parallel Paths 
  Uncertainty is the dominant reality of pharmaceutical 
research and development, just as it is in other R&D 
domains.  The relevant uncertainties are generally of two 
                                                 
9  Earlier, in 1995, the agencies released Guidelines for the Licensing of Intellectual Property that among 
other things proposed the concept of “innovation markets.”  The proposal was controversial and led to 
various dissenting articles.  See Richard J. Gilbert and Steven C. Sunshine, “Incorporating Dynamic 
Efficiency Concerns in Merger Analysis: the Use of Innovation Markets.” Antitrust Law Journal, Vol. 63, 
Winter 1995; Richard T. Rapp, “The Misapplication of the Innovation Market Approach to Merger 
Analysis,” Antitrust Law Journal, Vol. 64, Fall 1995; Dennis W. Carlton and Robert H. Gertner, 
“Intellectual Property, Antitrust, and Strategic Behavior,” in Adam Jaffee and Joshua Lerner, eds., 
Innovation Policy and the Economy Vol. 3, MIT Press, 2003; and Richard J. Gilbert and Steven C. 
Sunshine, “The Use of Innovation Markets: A Reply to Hay, Rapp, and Hoermer,” Antitrust Law Journal 
Vol. 64, 1995.    
   8
broad types:  uncertainty about whether a given approach or 
design or molecule will be technically successful, and 
uncertainty as to the magnitude of the payoffs, contingent 
upon technical success.
10   Both types are relevant for the 
discussion below. 
Pharmaceutical industry representatives often 
emphasize the first of these dimensions.  They assert that 
for every successful therapeutic agent, hundreds (or even 
thousands) of agents are investigated and discarded along 
the way.  Furthermore, uncertainty persists when 
prospective drugs enter clinical trials, since only about 
one out of five drugs entering such trials receives U.S. 
FDA approval and is commercially introduced.
11  An essential 
element in any research policy is how to confront this high 
degree of uncertainty.  A long-recognized means for coping 
with uncertainty is supporting parallel (and independent) 
research paths toward a specific technical objective. 
The oldest known example of this approach was the 
famous British Longitude Prize, announced in 1714, for 
which numerous individuals competed with proposed technical 
solutions.
12  Introducing the prize proposal to Parliament, 
                                                 
10  Attention to this important distinction was first drawn by Edwin Mansfield and others in The 
Production and Application of New Industrial Technology, Norton: 1977, pp. 22-32. 
11  Christopher P. Adams and Van V. Brantner, “Estimating the Cost of  New Drug Development: Is it 
Really $802 million?” Health Affairs, Vol. 25, 2006, pp. 402, 422.   
12   See Dava Sobel, Longitude (New York: Walker, 1995), especially pp. 51-60.    9
Isaac Newton offered a non-exclusive list of specific 
technical avenues. The one he considered least promising ex 
ante was the one that eventually won the prize.  Another 
example is the Manhattan Project of the 1940s, where U.S. 
authorities supported five different methods of separating 
the fissionable materials needed for an atomic bomb, with 
expenditures anticipated at the outset amounting to 0.3 
percent of U.S. gross national product in 1942.
13 
Recognizing the advantages of packing transistors into 
much smaller cubic volumes, the U.S. military services 
issued a dozen parallel R&D contracts to induce a 
solution.
14  None succeeded, but seeing the demand for such 
a product, two companies, Texas Instruments and Fairchild, 
invented the important integrated circuit concept.  The 
predecessor company to Fairchild had made numerous 
unsuccessful efforts to win one of the military contracts 
supporting its semiconductor miniaturization work.
15 
The explicit and implicit application of parallel path 
strategies by the U.S. military spurred theoretical work by 
economists on the subject.  The first important 
contribution was by Richard Nelson, who showed with a 
                                                 
13  See James Phinny Baxter, Scientists Against Time, (MIT Press, 1986), pp. 433-436. 
14.  See F. M. Scherer, Industry Structure, Strategy, and Public Policy (New York: HarperCollins, 1996), 
pp. 204-204. 
15.  From a conversation of F.M. Scherer with Victor Jones, a member of the Shockley Semiconductor Lab 
staff and later professor of solid state physics at Harvard University.   10
specific numerical example for fighter aircraft development 
that parallel development strategies could yield more 
advantageous results than a monolithic approach.
16 
Soon thereafter, M.J. Peck and F.M. Scherer identified 
parallel R&D paths as one element of a broader time-cost 
tradeoff problem in weapons development.
17  The essence of 
this strategy was 
operating simultaneously two or more approaches 
to the step, test, or problem to insure that at 
least one approach will hit the mark at the 
earliest possible moment.
18  
 
Peck and Scherer showed that the deeper was the stream of 
benefits flowing from successful development, the greater 
the support for a strategy of time-reducing parallel 
paths.
19  They argue that R&D is an investment seeking to 
yield a stream of benefits in the future, pursuing more 
sequential approaches to research and development often 
leads to foregone payoffs during the period of probable 
delay.   
In a 1966 article, Scherer extended that analysis by 
exploring various combinations of parallel and sequential 
                                                 
16  Richard R. Nelson, "Uncertainty, Learning, and the Economics of Parallel Research and Development," 
Review of Economics and Statistics, November 1961, pp. 351-368. 
17  Merton J. Peck and F. M. Scherer, The Weapons Acquisition Process: An Economic Analysis (Harvard 
Business School Division of Research, 1962), pp. 254-263 and 276-281.  The manuscript was in draft form 
by the summer of 1961, when Peck joined the Department of Defense staff. 
18   Ibid., p. 261. 
19  Ibid., pp. 254-263 and 276-281.   11
R&D project scheduling alternatives, finding that a convex 
time-cost tradeoff set persisted over a broad range of 
assumptions.
20  In a simulation analysis entailing pure 
parallel path strategies, he found that the maximum surplus 
of benefits minus R&D costs was gained by supporting more 
parallel paths, the deeper was the stream of benefits 
arising from successful projects. 
The time-cost tradeoff, however, was highly sensitive 
to the single-approach ex ante probability of success.  
With success probabilities on the order of 0.2 -- i.e., 
analogous to success probabilities in the clinical testing 
of drugs -- from 10 to 20 parallel paths were warranted, 
assuming the presence of promising alternatives.  With 
success probabilities of one in one hundred, however - more 
favorable than what is typically experienced in pre-
clinical drug candidate screening - supporting as many as 
200 parallel paths was warranted with sufficiently rich 
possibilities and deep post-success benefit streams.   
  A further contribution was made by Abernathy and 
Rosenbloom, who explicitly modeled the choice between a 
                                                 
20  F.M. Scherer, "Time-Cost Tradeoffs in Uncertain Empirical Research Projects," Naval Research 
Logistics Quarterly, March and September 1966; reprinted as  Ch. 4 in F.M. Scherer, Innovation and 
Growth  Schumpeterian Perspectives, MIT Press, 1984, pp. 67-82.  Sensitivity to mixtures of parallel and 
sequential strategies is analyzed in F.M. Scherer, "Parallel Paths Revisited," John F. Kennedy School of 
Government working paper RWP07-040, September 2007, pp. 1-24. 
   
   12
parallel strategy, defined as “the simultaneous pursuit of 
two or more distinct approaches to a single task,” and the 
alternative sequential strategy, which involves selecting 
“the best evident approach, taking up other possibilities 
only if the first proves unsuccessful.”
21  They emphasized 
that “initial judgments of cost, performance, and value are 
[generally] highly inaccurate,” so that a parallel 
development strategy serves as an important hedge “against 
the consequences of failure.”
22 
 
A Dartboard Experiment 
  To explore how uncertainty about payoff magnitudes 
affects parallel path strategy choices, we extend here 
Scherer’s earlier and more limited simulation analysis.
23  
The selection of R&D projects supported to their final 
outcomes is modeled as throwing darts at a dartboard, the 
cells of which are the varying payoffs contingent upon 
research and marketing success.  We assume that the returns 
from introducing new pharmaceuticals are highly skew and 
can be represented by a log normal distribution. That is, 
                                                 
21   William J. Abernathy and Richard S. Rosenbloom, “Parallel Strategies in Development Projects,” 
Management Science, Vol. 18, June 1969, p. 486.  
22   Ibid., pp. 488, 502. 
23  F.M. Scherer, "Schumpeter and the Micro-Foundations of Endogenous Growth," in Horst Hanusch and 
Andreas Pyka, eds., The Elgar Companion to Neo-Schumpeterian Economics, Edward Elgar: 2007, pp. 
682-685. 
   13
where N(0,1) is a random variable distributed normally with 
mean of zero and variance of 1, the distribution of payoffs 
is given by: 
 
(1)  D(P) = k X 
N(0,1) 
 
where D(P) is the distribution function; k and X are 
scaling parameters; and X is arbitrarily set at 10 and k at 
1000 (e.g., dollars, multiplied by whatever further scaling 
parameter is suited to reflect market realities).   
To represent the considerable uncertainty associated 
with the research process, “throws” cannot be directed 
specifically at the cells with the highest payoffs but 
instead are randomly distributed, with equal probability, 
to any of 100 possible cells.  R&D costs per "throw" are 
also permitted to vary, from zero to $12,000.  The 
strategies are purely parallel; no allowance is made for 
strategies in which a smaller number of throws is attempted 
at the start but then followed by more throws if the 
objectives are not attained. 
Under conditions of certainty, equivalent here to 
having a perfect aim, the decision-maker would throw a 
single dart at each cell for which the payoff exceeds the 
cost of the throw.  With the assumed log normal payoff   14
distribution, the average number of such throws varied with 
R&D cost as follows: 
 
 R&D  Cost    No.  of  Throws  
  
 $12,000     15 
   10,000     17 
     8,000     19 
     6,000     22 
     4,000     29 
     2,000     39 
    0          100  
 
As expected, when costs are zero, dart-throwing with 
perfect aim continues until all hundred cells are covered. 
In each experiment, additional "hits" on the same 
payoff cell are considered to add no incremental value. 
This reflects the real-world case that when, say, two 
virtually identical products are launched with the same 
product characteristics, the two share the anticipated 
payoff.  In experiments with 100 trials, the average number 
of duplicated "hits" was on the order of 36, and even with 
only five trials, occasional double hits were recorded.  
That some payoff cells are not exploited explains why the 
optimal number of trials can exceed 100 with low R&D costs 
per trial: one keeps trying in the hope of hitting untapped 
payoffs. 
A key assumption in the analysis was that each trial's   15
"hit" location was statistically independent of other 
trials.  This assumption could be violated in reality when 
the targeting of individual trials is positively 
correlated, e.g., when a single company launches multiple 
parallel trials but favors certain broad technical 
approaches over others.  If the number of multiple "hits" 
is increased for this reason, average net payoffs are lower 
for any given number of trials. 
To achieve reasonably general results in the face of 
widely varying payoffs, forty full experiments were carried 
out.  For each experiment, a new set of 100 payoffs 
distributed according to equation (1) was generated, taking 
care to choose a different normal distribution "seed" for 
each iteration.  As expected, right-hand tail values varied 
widely across experiments.  The largest single extreme 
payoff value was $1,065,124; the minimax (i.e., the lowest 
maximum across 40 experiments) was $58,010; the mean among 
the 40 experiments' maxima was $334,532.  At the other 
extreme, many payoffs were minimal; and the average payoff 
across all forty experiments was $7,032.
24   
Figure 9 summarizes the results for the 40 complete 
experiments, with the number of trials per experiment 
                                                 
24  For those who doubt that random sampling from skew distributions can generate such widely varying 
results, see the whole-pharmaceutical industry simulation in Scherer and Dietmar Harhoff, supra note 11, 
pp. 562-564; and William Nordhaus, "Comment," Brookings Paper on Economic Activity: Microeconomics 
(1989), pp. 320-325.   16
ranging from 5 to 100.  The values graphed are total 
payoffs for a given number of trials, averaged across all 
40 experiments, less total R&D costs, measured by the 
assumed cost per trial times the number of trials. 
Consistent with expectations, the net value-maximizing 
number of “throws” was higher, the lower the R&D cost per 
“throw,” with optima ranging from 25 “throws” to more than 
100 “throws” at zero R&D costs.   
At low R&D costs -- $4,000 per trial or less -- 
average net payoffs are also maximized by extending the 
number of trials to more than 100, which means attempting 
(given duplicates, unsuccessfully) to hit every cell on the 
dartboard.  With R&D costs of $6,000, two local maxima 
emerged -- one with 20 trials and an average net payoff of 
$120,650, and a maximum maximorum at 50 trials with an 
average net payoff of $149,829 after deducting the $300,000 
total R&D cost per experiment.
25  With still higher R&D 
costs, the 20-trial strategy dominates, so that at R&D 
costs of $8,000 per trial, there are mean net payoffs of 
$80,650 with 20 trials as compared to $62,979 with 40 
trials. 
Given the substantial variability of payoffs stemming 
                                                 
25 This duality results from the considerable variability of outcomes even with 40 experiments.  The 20-
throw experiments were apparently unusually lucky.  Asymptotically, a single optimum would emerge.      17
from the log normal distribution, whose use we justify 
below, what we conclude from this experiment is as follows: 
when R&D payoffs per trial approach R&D costs, leading to 
break-even returns, the strategy that maximizes the 
expected value of net payoffs lies somewhere between 15 and 
40 trials. 
To be sure, the optimal number of parallel paths 
hinges on our assumption that the payoff matrix contains 
one hundred payoff possibilities.  In reality, the number 
of plausible opportunities even at the clinical development 
stage could be larger or smaller.  Therefore, this analysis 
only demonstrates that parallel paths are desirable under 
certain circumstances.  It cannot show, without appropriate 
adaptation, how many parallel paths are optimal in a 
specific real-world situation.  However, the optimal number 
will expand with the number of possible technological 
opportunities.  
 
The Structure of Pharmaceutical Research and Development  
    We turn now to features of pharmaceutical research and 
development that relate to the parameters assumed in the 
simulation analysis.  Of particular relevance is the 
striking shift that has occurred in the degree of vertical 
integration.  Since the biotechnology revolution in   18
pharmaceutical research,
26 an increasing fraction of 
exploratory (molecule discovery) research has been carried 
out in small, often single-project, firms.  Frequently, 
these smaller research entities are start-up biotech firms.  
In contrast, the major pharmaceutical companies have 
retained their long-standing dominance in preparing New 
Drug Applications (NDA) for the FDA along with the detailed 
and highly expensive clinical testing required for new 
drugs.
27   
  This pattern is apparent in Scherer’s study of the 
origins of 85 new medical entities approved by the Food and 
Drug Administration between 2001 and 2005.
  
Examining the 
patents associated with NDAs submitted for regulatory 
approval, he finds that 47 percent were issued to firms or 
non-profit entities with names different from those of the 
ultimate FDA approval recipient. An even higher 54 percent 
of the earliest patents originated from outsiders. Although 
some may have involved subtle cross-ownership ties, he 
concludes that the leading pharmaceutical companies have 
come to rely heavily on outsiders for the pharmaceutical 
innovations they eventually bring to market.
28  
                                                 
26   Alexander Scriabine, “The Role of Biotechnology in Drug Development,” in Ralph Landau et al. eds., 
Pharmaceutical Innovation, Chemical Heritage Press, 1999, pp. 271-297.  
27  William S. Comanor, “The Economics of Research and Development in the Pharmaceutical Industry,” in 
Frank A. Sloan and C.R. Hsieh, Pharmaceutical Innovation, Cambridge University Press, 2007, pp. 54-72.  
28  F.M. Scherer, 2010, p. 552.      19
  In their interactions with these smaller research-
oriented firms, Big Pharma companies fill an essential 
economic role. Biotech firms typically enjoy the advantages 
of a rapidly advancing scientific base, Ph.D.-intensive 
staffs, and a vast trove of unexploited medical 
possibilities, all in sharp contrast to the apparently 
growing obsolescence of the small-molecule discovery 
techniques on which Big Pharma companies have traditionally 
focused. On the other hand, the large companies commonly 
have the resources and expertise needed to support large-
scale clinical trials.  They also have the ability to 
shepherd the results through the labyrinthine Food and Drug 
Administration approval process. 
These complementarities offer strong incentives for 
collaborations.  Some are organized through outright 
mergers, although there can be difficulties in assimilating 
the loosely-structured, basic science-oriented researchers 
of biotech companies into the more bureaucratic and 
applications-oriented laboratories of traditional large 
pharmaceutical companies.  Many of these collaborations 
take the form of alliances, under which the major companies 
provide financial support for on-going research efforts in 
return for some form of licensing arrangement on new drugs 
resulting from the process.     20
The decisions of the major pharmaceutical companies on 
which biotech advances to support can have a major effect 
on whether particular new drugs are introduced.  To be 
sure, there are circumstances where a large company will 
support more than a single independent biotech research 
program in the hope that one is successful.
29  However, even 
though numerous research efforts may be carried on within 
smaller companies at any moment in time, only a relatively 
few receive the follow-on industry funding and support 
needed for large-scale testing and commercialization and an 
unknown but not unsubstantial number of promising molecules 
left unsupported.  For this reason, as the number of 
companies available to assist and support biotech companies 
R&D efforts declines, so will the number of independent 
paths likely to be supported. 
  At the same time, the large drug companies have 
continued to pursue some discovery activities in their own 
laboratories, sometimes concurrently with externally 
supported efforts.  In path-breaking research, Cockburn and 
Henderson provide detailed descriptions of the internal 
discovery activities pursued in ten large companies during 
the 1980s.
30  They report that large companies pursue on 
                                                 
29  Iain Cockburn, Personal communication of February 15, 2011 and email message of March 25, 2011. 
30  Iain Cockburn and Rebecca Henderson, “Racing to Invest? The Dynamics of Competition in Ethical 
Drug Discovery,” Journal of Economics and  Management Strategy, Vol. 3, Fall 1994,  pp. 481-519;   21
average about ten substantial discovery programs per year, 
directed towards particular medical or therapeutic 
objectives that might span the entire range of 
biopharmaceutical research.
31  Such programs cost on average 
about $600,000 annually in 1986 dollars.  In addition, the 
respondent companies also tended to support on average six 
smaller programs, which could cost roughly $10,000 per 
year.
32 
  In the discovery phase of pharmaceutical R&D, the 
critical factor for innovation is the number of molecules 
carried forward into succeeding stages.  Although much of 
this scientific work is carried out within smaller biotech 
companies, the decisions of the larger companies as to 
which research projects to provide financing and support 
can largely determine their outcomes.           
  The discovery phase of the R&D process consumes a 
minority share of R&D dollars spent by Big Pharma 
companies.  According to Cockburn and Henderson, about two-
thirds of R&D dollars are used for drug development rather 
                                                                                                                                                 
“Scale, Scope, and Spillovers: the Determinants of Research Productivity in Drug Discovery,” RAND 
Journal of Economics, Vol. 27, Spring 1996, pp. 32-59; “Scale and Scope in Drug  Development: 
Unpacking the Advantages of Size in Pharmaceutical Research,” Journal of Health Economics, 2001, pp. 
1-25.       
31  Discovery programs are defined by three conditions:  a separate budget unit, a designated collection of 
people engaged in the research work, and a specified objective.  Although different companies may use 
different terminology, all three conditions must be met for the designation of a research program.  These 
programs may include more than one target molecule and are generally disease-specific efforts.   Cockburn, 
2011. 
32  Cockburn and Henderson, 1996, p. 43.   22
than drug discovery,
33 where development entails the 
translation of promising new molecules into marketable 
products.  Costs are greater there because marketability 
requires regulatory approval, which demands up to four 
phases of very costly testing procedures.  In 1990, the 
average development program
34 lasted just under five years 
and cost about $200 million.
35  Cockburn and Henderson find 
that development projects can be quite risky, with 
on average, only one in five of the compounds that 
begun substantial clinical testing in our data 
resulting in the filing of an application for new drug 
approval (NDA), and even fewer were granted an NDA and 
reached the marketplace.
36   
 
  On a per-firm basis, the average firm in their sample 
of ten companies had underway nearly sixteen development 
programs per year.  Therefore, the typical drug company in 
the sample must have originated between three and four new 
programs per year.
37  Moreover, the average firm had 
programs in more than fourteen therapeutic areas.
38  
Dividing their 16 programs by 14 therapeutic areas, we 
conclude that the large companies have tended to limit 
                                                 
33  Cockburn and Henderson, 2001, p. 5. 
34  Development programs are typically molecule-specific, or limited to a closely related set of molecules.  
Cockburn, 2011. 
35  Cockburn and Henderson, 2001, p. 4. 
36  Ibid. 
37  Development programs last about 5 years and the average firm is engaged in 16 of them; then dividing 
16 by 5 suggests the average number that need be started each year to maintain this level of activity. 
38  Cockburn and Henderson, 2001, pp. 8-9.   23
their development activities to a single program within any 
given therapeutic area. 
  To test this finding, we examined the disease areas 
subject to Phase III clinical trials for the five largest 
U.S. companies for the years 2009 and 2010.  Our results 
are as follows: 
 
Merck engaged in 25 trials, of which 2 were for the same 
condition; thus 92 percent were not duplicated. 
 
Johnson & Johnson engaged in 21 trials, of which 2 were for 
the same condition; thus 90 percent were not duplicated. 
 
Pfizer engaged in 12 trials, of which 2 were for the same 
condition; thus 83 percent were not duplicated. 
 
Lilly engaged in 13 trials, of which 7 were for the same 
condition; thus 46 percent were not duplicated. 
 
Bristol-Myers Squibb engaged in 8 trials, of which 2 were 
for the same condition; thus 75 percent were not 
duplicated.
39 
 
 
The five companies together engaged in 79 trials, of which 
15 represented parallel efforts.  Thus, 81 percent were not 
duplicated in terms of their therapeutic goals.  While this 
suggests some degree of parallelism at the development 
stage, it is relatively modest.     
  These findings can be interpreted in light of our 
earlier analysis of parallel research paths.  Although the 
larger companies sometimes adopt a parallel path strategy 
                                                 
39  These findings are compilations from the data available on the www.clinicaltrials.gov web site.     24
at the discovery stage by supporting one or more external 
programs along with an internal one, that rarely occurs at 
the development stage.  In particular, the data indicate 
that large companies, with the apparent exception of 
Lilly,
40 rarely pursue more than a single program in any 
given therapeutic area. 
One explanation is that introducing a second product 
in the same therapeutic area is not likely to increase a 
company’s sales proportionately.  Except in rare 
breakthrough cases, patented products within a therapeutic 
area compete with each other,
41 and therefore will draw a 
proportion of their sales from the firm’s other products.  
The incentive to bear the high costs of development 
programs is therefore attenuated as compared with research 
efforts carried out in separate firms.
42   
From this brief discussion of pharmaceutical R&D 
activities, we infer the following conclusion:  the number 
of paths pursued at the development stage of pharmaceutical 
R&D in individual therapeutic areas is not likely to exceed 
by much the number of large pharmaceutical companies.     
                                                 
40   On Lilly’s deviant strategy, see Bernard Munos, “Lessons from 60 Years of Pharmaceutical 
Innovation,” Nature Reviews/ Drug Discovery, Vol. 8, December 2009.  
41 Z. John Lu and William S. Comanor, “Strategic Pricing of New Pharmaceuticals,” Review of Economics 
and Statistics, Vol. 80, Feb. 1998, pp. 114-115. 
42  This argument is hardly new, as a variation of it appeared sixty years ago.  See William J. Fellner, “The 
Influence of Market Structure on Technological Progress,” Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol. 65, 
November 1951, pp. 556-577.  See also F.M. Scherer and David Ross, Industrial Market Structure and 
Economic Performance, 3
rd ed., 1990, Ch. 17, pp.      25
  Even when development projects succeed and lead to new 
product introductions, considerable uncertainty remains 
about the returns that follow.  In a series of papers 
applicable to the 1970s, 1980s and 1990s, Grabowski and 
colleagues have investigated the distribution of net 
economic returns from new drugs.
43  Most recently, they 
report net product quasi-rents before deduction of R&D 
costs for the 118 new chemical entities introduced between 
1990 and 1994, ordered by deciles from highest to lowest.  
The distribution is highly skew, with the top decile alone 
accounting for 52 percent of the aggregate present values 
across all 118 new drugs.
44  This degree of skewness, 
moreover, is not exceptional.  They also find that “the top 
decile has accounted for between 46 and 54 percent of the 
overall returns over the four sample cohorts … analyzed.”
45 
  This evidence supports our use of the log normal 
distribution to describe the payoffs from innovation, even 
though that distribution is more skew than the distribution 
of quasi-rents reported by Grabowski and colleagues.  The 
top ten percent cohort in the log normal distribution of 
                                                 
43  Henry Grabowski, John Vernon and Joseph A. DiMasi, “Returns on Research and Development for 
1990s New Drug Introductions,” Pharmacoeconomics, Vol. 20, 2002,  pp. 11-29; Henry G. Grabowski and 
John M. Vernon, “Returns to R&D on New Drug Introductions in the 1980s,” Journal of Health 
Economics, Vol. 13, 1994, pp. 383-406; and “A New Look at the Returns and Risks to Pharmaceutical 
R&D,” Management Science, Vol. 36, July 1990, pp. 804-821. 
44  Grabowski, Vernon and DiMasi, 2002, p. 22.  
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equation (1) captures roughly 80 percent of total payoffs.  
However, Grabowski and colleagues analyze the returns from 
new molecules approved by the Food and Drug Administration 
and presumably marketed after passing that hurdle.  Our 
analysis deals instead with the development and testing 
activities that precede FDA approval.  As noted above, 
among the molecules carried into clinical testing in the 
United States, fewer than one in five are eventually 
approved.  If the number of molecules that begin rather 
then complete clinical trials is the sample base, the top 
ten percent of NDA recipients is roughly equivalent to the 
top 2.5 percent of the sample entering clinical testing.  
 The top 2.5 percent in our log normal sample account for 
about 54 percent of total sample  payoffs – quite similar 
to the range reported by Grabowski and Vernon.
46  The log 
normal distribution employed above therefore tracks the 
empirical evidence well.   
      
Rent-seeking and Social and Private Rates of Return 
  Under a rent-seeking model of R&D investment, rivals 
compete by making R&D “bets” that continue so long as 
                                                 
46  If the sample is extended to the much larger number of molecules not carried into human testing, the 
share of the NDA recipients analyzed by Grabowski et al. falls even more.  Molecules not receiving 
marketing approval might nevertheless have some value in terms of their information spillover value.  The 
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expected rewards exceed expected costs.
47  Competitive 
equilibrium is reached when expected rewards approximate 
expected costs.  Compelling evidence suggests that such 
rent-seeking behavior prevails in regard to pharmaceutical 
R&D.   
Henry Grabowski and colleagues studied the 
relationship of average discounted quasi-rent values to R&D 
costs for various periods from 1970 through the 1990s.
48  
They found that new product revenues from the 1990s only 
slightly exceeded R&D costs; specifically, that “the IRR 
(internal rate of return) is 11.5% and can be compared with 
our cost-of-capital estimate of 11%.  Hence, the industry 
mean performance is positive but only by a small amount.”
49 
A similar conclusion was reached in a government study 
that surveyed new chemical entities introduced between 1981 
and 1983.  Its conclusion was that 
the average revenue per compound was $36 million more 
in NPV (net present value) than was needed to bring 
forth the research on the drugs introduced. … This 
excess would be eliminated if annual revenues per 
compound were reduced by 4.3 percent.
50 
 
The study found that large drug companies earned rates of 
                                                 
47  For an early description of this process, see William S. Comanor, “Research and Competitive Product 
Differentiation in the Pharmaceutical Industry in the United States,” Economica, Vol. XXXI, November 
1964, pp. 372-384. 
48  Supra note 51. 
49  Garbowski, Vernon, and DiMasi, op. cit., 2002, p. 20. 
50  U.S. Congress, Office of Technology Assessment, Pharmaceutical R&D: Costs, Risks and Rewards, 
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return on their investment only two or three percentage 
points higher than the real cost of their financial 
capital.
51     
Both studies conclude that net revenues from 
pharmaceutical R&D exceeded the associated research costs, 
including those of failures, by only small amounts.  They 
support the inference that a zero net expected profit rent-
seeking process was approximated.  Recall the simulation 
analysis presented earlier.  Along the zero net payoff line 
in Figure 1, we identify the number of “dart throws” or 
research projects required to reach a zero net return 
equilibrium.  Those values describe the numbers of research 
paths needed to reach a competitive equilibrium that is 
based on expected payoffs and costs. 
  These inferences, moreover, reflect the private 
returns from pharmaceutical R&D rather than those that 
accrue more broadly to society.  There can be wide 
differences between private and social returns.  If social 
benefits, including consumer surpluses and the value of 
non-market externalities, exceed their associated private 
benefits, then fewer parallel paths might be pursued by 
private firms than would be socially optimal.  On the other 
                                                 
51  Ibid.  See also Scherer, 2010, p. 562.   29
hand, since rivals confront the same set of opportunities,
52 
parallel efforts are likely to occur.  Whether the 
parallelism thus engendered is sufficient to meet the 
requirements for a social optimum is unknown.  What is 
clear, however, is that reducing the number of rival firms 
tends to limit the extent of parallelism.  Therefore, if 
parallelism had reached near optimal levels under rent-
seeking behavior before consolidation, then reducing the 
number of rivals leads to fewer parallel paths and a slower 
rate of pharmaceutical innovation. 
  There is support for this conclusion from a study that 
correlated the number of new molecular entities (NME) 
approved by the FDA with the number of innovating 
companies.  The author reports that these variables are 
“closely correlated in a nonlinear relationship that 
explains 95% of the changes in expected NME output by 
changes in the number of companies.”
53  He observes further 
that the larger pharmaceutical companies “have delivered 
innovations at a constant rate for almost 60 years.”
54  In 
that case, reducing the number of innovating companies 
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implies fewer innovations, which is consistent with the 
analysis above of parallel research paths.         
  Again, a critical factor is the extent of the gap 
between social and private benefits from pharmaceutical 
research.  In pioneering research, Edwin Mansfield and 
colleagues reported that innovators' median profits from 
their research efforts were 25 percent before tax, while 
the median social return was on the order of 56 percent, or 
roughly twice the private return.
55   
  In a more recent study limited to pharmaceutical R&D, 
Frank Lichtenberg studied the impact of new drug approvals 
on reduced mortality.  Using a benchmark estimate of 
$25,000 per life-year saved, he estimated the social rate 
of return from pharmaceutical innovation at approximately 
68 percent per annum.
56  This value is nearly six times 
Grabowski’s figure for the private returns from 
pharmaceutical research and development.   
Lichtenberg acknowledges two sets of extenuating 
circumstances.  The first is that if life-years are valued 
instead at $10,000, his estimated return falls to 27 
                                                 
55  Edwin Mansfield et al., "Social and Private Rates of Return from Industrial Innovations," Quarterly 
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percent.  His second caveat, however, cuts in the opposite 
direction.  It rests on the fact that new drugs convey many 
social benefits beyond reduced mortality, such as reduced 
sickness and morbidity, fewer workdays and schooldays lost, 
and a generally improved quality of life.
57  Given the 
constraining assumptions of his empirical analysis, 
Lichtenberg concludes that the social returns from new drug 
development are probably even higher than the 68 percent 
return obtained in his statistical analysis.   
  These findings have direct implications for the 
optimal number of parallel research paths.  Where the 
social returns from R&D outlays greatly exceed their 
corresponding private returns, the desired number of 
parallel paths is larger than it would be by a strictly 
private calculus.  If parallel paths are mainly induced 
through rent-seeking behavior that carries R&D to the point 
where private returns approximately equal costs, then a 
decline in the number of rival firms could lead to fewer 
parallel approaches and increase the likelihood that the 
number of research paths pursued is socially sub-optimal.  
As a result, recent mergers that led to fewer parallel 
efforts reduced the rate of pharmaceutical innovation. 
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Policy Conclusions  
   In its consideration of the Pfizer-Wyeth merger, the 
Federal Trade Commission found that the merger was 
“unlikely to have an adverse impact on the development of 
human pharmaceutical products.”
58  That conclusion runs 
counter to one reported in a statistical study of 
pharmaceutical mergers: 
Another surprising finding is that companies that do 
essentially the same thing can have rates of NME 
output that differ widely.  This suggests there are 
substantial differences in the ability of different 
companies to foster innovation.  In this respect, the 
fact that the companies that have relied on M&A 
(Mergers and Acquisitions) tend to lag behind those 
that have not suggests that M&A are not an effective 
way to promote an innovation culture or remedy a 
deficit of innovation.
59 
    
  The analysis offered here also differs from the FTC 
position.  So important is the development of new 
pharmaceuticals for society’s welfare, and so problematic 
is the on-going decline in new drug development, that the 
U.S. government is considering the establishment of a new 
federal research center to pursue drug development.
60  There 
is an important public interest in promoting rapid 
pharmaceutical innovation, and policies that foster large 
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numbers of parallel paths directed towards the development 
of effective new drugs can be an important step towards 
that objective.   
  To be sure, the pursuit of parallel research paths is 
not limited to major pharmaceutical companies.  However, as 
the Cockburn–Henderson data show, the larger companies 
engage on average in development programs that are 
typically limited to a single therapeutic area.  Although 
smaller biotech firms add parallelism in discovery 
programs, that is not so for development programs, which 
typically require the financial and technical support 
available only in the larger companies.  Big Pharma 
companies play a critical role, particularly in the 
clinical testing process.  
Although one cannot know definitely whether the 
pharmaceutical industry, or individual member firms, were 
investing socially optimal amounts in research and 
development when industry concentration was lower, we can 
observe the effects of recent large mergers.  Even prior to 
these mergers, the amounts allocated to R&D by both Pfizer 
and Merck led to what was generally considered, both 
internally and by outside expert opinion, a disappointing 
yield of new pharmaceutical agents.   
The consequences of the two recent large mergers have   34
been distinctly negative.  Before their merger, Pfizer and 
Wyeth together were investing approximately $11.3 billion in 
R&D annually, while post-merger they spent $9.4 billion in 
2010 and announced plans to reduce spending still further to 
between $6.5 and $7 billion by 2012.
61  This implies a 
decline of 57 to 62 percent from prior levels.  At a minimum, 
one major Pfizer R&D laboratory will be closed and another 
substantially downsized.
62  Similarly, Merck announced that 
it would close at least three R&D facilities, but with the 
total R&D spending reduction left unspecified.
63  The effects 
of these mergers on R&D spending and employment were clearly 
negative, implying a reduction in the degree of parallelism 
in drug development.  
  Permitting horizontal mergers between large 
pharmaceutical companies appears to have limited the 
desirable pursuit of independent parallel paths in 
pharmaceutical development.  And it likely contributed to 
the decline in the rate of pharmaceutical innovation.                
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